





Kaspersky Industrial CyberSecurity

ТРАДИЦИОННЫЕ ПОДХОДЫ К КИБЕРЗАЩИТЕ СИСТЕМ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ



- **Изоляция сети управления от внешних информационных систем**
- **Сегментация сети**
- **Выделение демилитаризованных зон**

- **Составление правил и инструкций безопасной эксплуатации АСУ ТП**
- **Составление правил и инструкции соблюдения информационной безопасности в ИС АСУ ТП**

- **Использование системы аварийных блокировок**
- **Внедрение система противоаварийной защита**

This week's sponsor: [Strong Customer Authentication and Risk Analysis under PSD2: how](#)

Microsoft failed to properly patch the Stuxnet USB flaw in 2010... but has now (we hope)

Graham Cluley | March 11, 2015 2:20 am | Filed under: [Malware](#), [Microsoft](#), [Vulnerability](#), [Windows](#)

2

52
SHARES



I'm sure you remember the notorious Stuxnet worm, used in a joint US/Israeli operation to disrupt activities at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran.



Besides its tailored attacks against SCADA equipment, meddling with Iranian nuclear centrifuges, Stuxnet was also an eye-opener for its use of zero-day vulnerabilities.

Because Stuxnet was capable of installing itself automatically (with no user interaction required) onto a fully-patched Windows computer from a USB memory stick, even if the user has disabled the Windows AutoRun and AutoPlay feature.

58,7

СИСТЕМЫ БОЛЬШЕ НЕ

Stuxnet

ник в систему, преодолев «air gap»
2010

National

Monju power plant facility PC infected with virus

Jan. 7, 2014 | 03:35 pm JST | 25 Comments

TOKYO — A computer being used at the Monju prototype fast-breeder reactor facility in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, was recently discovered to have contracted a virus, and officials believe that some data from the computer may have been leaked as a result.

According to the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, which operates the facility, the computer in question was being used by on-duty facility employees to file company paperwork when the virus was first detected on Jan 2, TBS reported Tuesday.

Officials said that around 3 p.m., the computer began corresponding with a suspicious outside site. Although the computer contained many company-sensitive emails, employee data sheets and training logs, officials said they do not believe any safety-compromising data was leaked, TBS reported.

It is believed that the computer was infected with the virus when a video playback program was attempting to perform a regular software update. Personnel are investigating the cause of the incident and are creating plans to avoid any such potential safety mishaps in the future, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency said.

КОНТРОЛЯ НАД ИХ

update

заразил узел ПТК
тности персонала

2014





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Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01)

[More Alerts](#)

Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure

Original release date: February 25, 2016

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SUMMARY

On December 23, 2015, Ukrainian power companies experienced unscheduled power outages impacting a large number of customers in Ukraine. In addition, there have also been reports of malware found in Ukrainian companies in a variety of critical infrastructure sectors. Public reports indicate that the BlackEnergy (BE) malware was discovered on the companies' computer networks, however it is important to note that the role of BE in this event remains unknown pending further technical analysis.

ДРУГИЕ ПРИОРИТЕТЫ



1. ДОСТУПНОСТЬ
2. ЦЕЛОСТНОСТЬ
3. КОНФИДЕНЦИАЛЬНОСТЬ



1. КОНФИДЕНЦИАЛЬНОСТЬ
2. ЦЕЛОСТНОСТЬ
3. ДОСТУПНОСТЬ

О РЕШЕНИИ



KASPERSKY INDUSTRIAL CYBERSECURITY: СТРУКТУРА РЕШЕНИЯ



ФУНКЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ КОМПОНЕНТЫ



ЗАЩИТА ОТ
ВРЕДНОСНОГО ПО



ЦЕНТРАЛИЗОВАННОЕ
УПРАВЛЕНИЕ



КОНТРОЛЬ
ЦЕЛОСТНОСТИ



МОНИТОРИНГ
УЯЗВИМОСТЕЙ



СИСТЕМА ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЯ
ВТОРЖЕНИЙ



СИСТЕМА
РАССЛЕДОВАНИЯ ИНЦИДЕНТОВ



ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ С ДРУГИМИ
РЕШЕНИЯМИ

СЕРВИСЫ




ОБУЧАЮЩИЕ СЕРВИСЫ




ЭКСПЕРТНЫЕ СЕРВИСЫ


KASPERSKY INDUSTRIAL CYBERSECURITY




KASPERSKY INDUSTRIAL CYBERSECURITY




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
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


KASPERSKY INDUSTRIAL CYBERSECURITY




KICS FOR NODES

- Запрет по умолчанию
- Оценка уязвимостей
- Контроль устройств
- Контроль целостности ПЛК
- Режим высокой доступности
- Работает на SCADA-серверах, инженерных рабочих станциях и поддерживает HMI




KICS FOR NODES: СПЕЦИФИКА ОТРАСЛИ

- Низкие требования к ПК, 256-512 MB RAM on Windows XP SP2 / XP Embedded
- Режим мониторинга
- Для изолированных сред
- Сертификаты совместимости с ICS вендорами
- Ограниченный набор компонентов



KICS FOR NETWORKS

- Контроль целостности сети (обнаружение новых устройств в промышленной сети)
- Обнаружение аномалий в технологических сетях
- Обнаружение управляющих команд, приводящих к нарушению технологического процесса
- Расследование, мониторинг и средство обнаружения инцидентов



КОНТРОЛЬ ЦЕЛОСТНОСТИ ПРОЕКТОВ ПЛК

Data for PLC project integrity checks

Data for PLC project

PLC Type: Siemens SIMATIC S7-300 ID: 9046FA71
IP-address: 192.168.0.2 Rack number: 0
Port: 102 Slot number: 2
Description: CPU model : 6ES7 314-1AG14-0A80 ; Firmware version : 32.9.9; Serial Number : S C-C4VA60002012

PLC configuration polling interval
1 min. 0 s.

Project version to consider as reference for PLC configuration selected:

Reference PLC project receipt date	PLC project hash	Description
11.02.2017 0:41:04	01034bde4c00f6438b03b7c8083db...	PLC
11.02.2017 0:30:53	01034bde4c00f6438b03b7c8083db...	PLC

Event settings

Sections

General

PLC project does not match reference project

Severity: Critical event
Application: Kaspersky Industrial CyberSecurity for Nodes 2.0
Version number: 2.0.0.111
Task name: PLC Project Integrity Check
Device: PCVUE-WIN7-64
Group: OS
Time: 20.02.2017 16:14:48
Virtual Server name:
Description: Controller type: Siemens SIMATIC S7-300. PLC configuration parameters: IP address: 192.168.0.2; port: 102; rack: 0; slot: 2. Description: CPU model : 6ES7 314-1AG14-0A80 ; Firmware version : 32.9.9; Serial Number : S C-C4VA60002012. PLC configuration identifier: 3139322e3136382e302e3230303130323030303030323030

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